This paper provides a theory of money, whose value depends on the functioning of the intermediary sector, and a unified framework for analyzing the interaction between price and financial stability. Households that happen to be productive in this period finance their capital purchases with credit from intermediaries and from their own savings. Less productive household save by holding deposits with intermediaries (inside money) or outside money. Intermediation involves risk-taking, and intermediaries' ability to lend is compromised when they suffer losses. After an adverse productivity shock, credit and inside money shrink, and the value of (outside) money increases, causing deflation that hurts borrowers even further. An accommodating monetary policy in downturns can mitigate these destabilizing adverse feedback effects. Lowering short-term interest rates increases the value of long-term bonds, recapitalizes the intermediaries by redistributes wealth. While this policy helps the economy ex-post, ex-ante it can lead to excessive risk-taking by the intermediary sector. * Preliminary and Incomplete. We are grateful to comments by seminar participants at Princeton, Bank of Japan, Philadelphia Fed, Rutgers,
Introduction
A theory of money needs a proper place for financial intermediaries. Financial institutions are able to create money, for example by lending to businesses and home buyers, and accepting deposits backed by those loans. The amount of money created by financial intermediaries depends crucially on the health of the banking system and on the presence of profitable investment opportunities in the economy. This paper proposes a theory of money and provides a framework for analyzing the interaction between price stability and financial stability. It therefore provides a unified way of thinking about monetary and macroprudential policy.
Since intermediation involves taking on some risk, a negative shock to productive agents also hits intermediary balance sheets. Intermediaries' individually optimal response is to lend less and accept fewer deposits. Hence, the amount of inside money in the economy shrinks. Because money serves as a store of value and the total demand for money changes little, the value of outside money increases inducing deflationary pressure. More specifically, in our model the economy moves between two polar cases: in one case the the financial sector is well capitalized: it can overcome financial frictions and is able to channel funds from less productive agents to more productive agents. Financial institutions through their monitoring role enable productive agents to issue debt and equity claims. The value of money is low. In contrast in the other polar case, in which the financial sector is undercapitalized, funds can only be transferred via outside money. Whenever an agent becomes productive he buys capital goods from less productive households using his outside money, and vice versa. That is, outside money allows de facto some implicit borrowing and lending. In this case outside money steps in for the missing financial intermediation. The value of money is high. A negative shock to productive agents lowers the financial sector's risk bearing capacity and hence brings us closer to the second case with high value of money. That is, a negative productivity shock leads deflation a la Fisher (1933) . Since financial institutions accept demand deposits they are hit on both sides of their balance sheet. First, they are exposed to productivity shocks on the asset side of the balance sheet. Second, their liabilities grow after a negative shock as the value of money increases. This amplifies the initial shock even further, absent appropriate monetary policy. This leads to non-linear adverse feedback loop effects and liquidity spirals as studied in . In addition, the money multiplier is endogenous and declines with the health of the financial system.
We then study the effect of monetary policy on the intermediary sector. We focus on budget-neutral monetary policies that do not affect government spending, and consider both interest-rate policies (implemented by printing money) and open-market operations that change the maturity structure of government liabilities. We find that in the absence of longterm government bonds, interest rate policy on its own has no real effects on the economy. That is, if the monetary authority pays interest on reserves by printing money, the only effect is that the interest rate always equals the nominal inflation. This result holds because all debt is short-term in our model, and we do not allow for surprise changes in the interest-rate policy.
However, with long-term (government) bonds that pay a fixed rate of interest, interestrate policy can have real effects. Then, if the monetary authority always sets a positive interest rate, bonds and cash are substitutes in the sense that unproductive households can use both of these assets to store wealth.
1 If the monetary authority lowers interest rates in downturns, then the value of long-term bonds rises. Intermediaries can hold these long-term nominal assets as a hedge against losses due to negative macro shocks. In other words, interest-rate cuts can help banks in downturns, as long as they hold nominal assets with longer maturities. We refer to this phenomenon as "stealth recapitalization" as it redistributes wealth. Importantly, this is however not a zero sum game. Of course, while this policy can help banks ex-post, by reducing further losses that they are exposed to, it can create extra risk-taking incentives ex-ante. Related Literature. While in almost all papers, a negative productivity shock causes inflationary pressures, in our setting it induces deflationary pressure absent a monetary intervention. This is consistent with the empirical output-inflation patterns before 1960 under the (extended) Gold Standard, as e.g. documented by Cagan (1979) . Like in monetarism (see e.g. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) ), an endogenous reduction of money multiplier (given a fixed monetary base) leads to deflation in our setting. However, in our setting outside money is only an imperfect substitute for inside money. Intermediaries, either by channeling funds through or by underwriting and thereby enabling firms to approach capital markets directly, enable a better capital allocation and more economic growth. Hence, in our setting monetary intervention should aim to recapitalize undercapitalized borrowers rather than simply increase the money supply across the board. Another difference is that our approach focuses more on the role of money as a store of value instead of the transaction role of money. Overall, our approach is closer in spirit to banking channel literature, see e.g. Patinkin (1965) , Tobin (1970) , Gurley and Shaw (1955) , Bernanke (1983) Bernanke and Blinder (1988) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) .
2 Another distinct feature of our setting is that our effects arise despite the fact that prices are fully flexible. This is in sharp contrast to the New Keynesian framework, in which a nominal interest rate cut also lowers real rates and thereby induces households to consume more. Recently, Cordia and Woodford (2010) introduced financial frictions in the new Keynesian framework. In contrast, our framework focuses on the redistributional role of monetary policy, a feature we share with Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) . In Kiyotaki and Moore (2008) money is desirable as it does not suffer from a resellability constraint, unlike capital in their model. Within a three-period framework, Diamond and Rajan (2006) and Stein (2010) also address the role of monetary policy as a tool to achieve financial stability. More generally, there is a growing macro literature which also investigated how macro shocks that affect the balance sheets of intermediaries become amplified and affect the amount of lending and the real economy. These papers include Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , who study financial frictions using a log-linearized model near steady state. In these models shocks to intermediary net worths affect the efficiency of capital allocation and asset prices. However, log-linearized solutions preclude volatility effects and lead to stable system dynamics. also study full equilibrium dynamics, focusing on the differences in system behavior near the steady state, and away from it. They find that the system is stable to small shocks near the steady state, but large shocks make the system unstable and generate systemic endogenous risk. Thus, system dynamics are highly nonlinear. Large shocks have much more serious effects on the real economy than small shocks. also study the full equilibrium dynamics and focus in particular on credit spreads. For a more detailed review of the literature we refer to . This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 informally describes the logical framework around which we construct our model. Section 3 frames the ideas from Section 2 into a basic model. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 5 presents a computed example and discusses equilibrium properties, including capital and money value dynamics, the amount of lending through intermediaries, and the money multiplier. Section 6 introduces longterm bonds and studies the effect of interest-rate policies as well as open-market operations. Section 7 concludes.
Informal Description of the Economy
In this section we describe informally how we think about money and intermediation. The goal is to explain the logic behind the main results and to lay out a general framework that we implement in the next section.
The economy is populated by intermediaries and heterogeneous households. The distribution of productivity among households does not match the distribution of wealth. As a result, productive households, whom we call entrepreneurs, need financing to be able to manage capital. In the absence of intermediaries there are extreme financial frictions: unproductive households with excess wealth cannot lend directly to financially constrained entrepreneurs. In the absence of money, these frictions lead to an extremely inefficient allocation of capital, in which each agent holds the amount of capital that is proportionate to his net worth. For example, if the wealth of entrepreneurs is only 1% of aggregate wealth, then they can hold only 1% of capital.
If household types are switching, then there can be a more efficient equilibrium with fiat money. Assume that there is a fixed supply of infinitely divisible money. Even though it is intrinsically worthless, in equilibrium money can have value by a mechanism which can be related to the models of Samuelson (1958) and Bewley (1980) . 3 Crucially, in order for money to have value, enough agents should create demand for new savings through money to offset the supply of money by agents who want to spend it to consume. In our model, this demand stems from agents who suddenly become unproductive, and who want to exchange their capital to hold money. If so, then these agents supply capital and demand money, agents who stay unproductive supply money and demand output, and agents who stay productive supply output and demand more capital. In equilibrium, the relative prices of capital, money and output are determined so that all markets clear. Money in equilibrium can lead to a more efficient allocation of capital. Even with extreme financial frictions that preclude borrowing and lending, the allocation of capital across agents does not have to be proportional to their net worths. In fact, it may be possible for entrepreneurs to hold all capital in the economy, while unproductive households hold money.
Nevertheless, when there is investment, the equilibrium with money is less efficient than the efficient outcome that arises in the absence of financial frictions. Without borrowing and lending, the entrepreneurs' demand for capital is limited by their net worths. As a result, even with money in equilibrium, capital becomes undervalued, leading to underinvestment in capital. Furthermore, given low capital valuations, unproductive households may find it attractive to hold some capital, leading to an inefficient allocation. We introduce intermediaries who can mitigate the financial frictions by facilitating lending from unproductive households to productive ones. Intermediaries can take deposits from unproductive households to extend loans to entrepreneurs.
4 Importantly, when they facilitate the flow of funds from unproductive agents to entrepreneurs, intermediaries must invariably be exposed to the risks of the projects they finance. They msut have some "skin in the game." The intermediaries' ability to perform their functions depends on their riskbearing capacity. Because intermediaries are subject to the solvency constraint, their ability to absorb risks depends on their net worths, and so after losses they are less able to perform their functions. Risk taking by intermediaries leads economic fluctuations between a two polar cases: One polar case looks like the benchmark without financial frictions and in the second regime there is no lending and hence money plays a much more important role. In the former regime, banks create a large quantity of inside money by lending freely. Unproductive agents have alternative ways to save other than holding outside money -they can hold deposits with intermediaries (or entrepreneur equity). As a result, outside money has low value. At the same time, easy financing leads to a high price of capital and high investment.
If an aggregate macro shock causes intermediaries to suffer losses, lending contracts, causing entrepreneurs to reduce their demand for capital. As a result, the price of capital and investment fall. At the same time, as the creation of inside money decreases, unproductive households bid up the value of outside money to satisfy their demand for savings. This leads to a collapse of the money multiplier and deflation.
When deposits with intermediaries are denominated in money rather than output, then deflation increases the value of liabilities of intermediaries. Thus, intermediaries are doubly hit: on the asset side because the value of capital that they finance decreases, and on the liabilities side because the real value of their obligations goes up in value.
We construct a model that captures these dynamic effects in the next section. In Section 4 we introduce in addition some long-term bonds and study how monetary policy and macroprudential policy can mitigate these adverse effects.
The Formal Baseline Model
We consider an infinite-horizon economy populated by heterogeneous households and intermediaries. Household types are denoted by ω ∈ Ω, where Ω could be an interval, or a finite set. Higher types are more productive. In our baseline model, which we present in this section, we assume that there is a fixed amount of gold in the economy, which serves as money. Gold is intrinsically worthless, and the total quantity of gold is fixed.
Household Production Technologies. The technology of household type ω generates output at rate a ω − ι t per unit of capital, where a ω is the productivity parameter and ι ω t is the rate of investment. Capital is measured in efficiency units, and the quantity of capital evolves according to
Function Φ reflects a decreasing-returns-to-scale investment technology, with Φ(0) = 0, Φ > 0 and Φ < 0. That is, in the absence of investment, capital managed by household ω simply depreciates at rate δ ω . The term d ω t reflects Brownian fundamental shocks to technology ω. The technological shocks of types ω and ω ∈ Ω have covariance σ(ω, ω ), so that σ(ω, ω) is the volatility of ω t . We assume that a ω weakly increases in type ω, while δ ω decreases in ω.
Intermediation. Intermediaries can lend to productive households or invest in their equity. In our model equity investment in household ω works as if the intermediary were directly holding capital employed under the production technology of household ω, except for an additional monitoring cost. We express the monitoring cost of equity financing through an increased depreciation rate by . Thus, intermediaries can improve efficiency in the economy in two ways: by channeling funds to the most productive technologies, and by diversifying household risks on their balance sheets. Intermediaries finance themselves borrowing from households.
Markets for Capital, Money and Consumption Goods. All markets are fully liquid. All agents are small, and can buy or sell unlimited quantities of capital, money and output in the market at any moment of time at current prices without making any price impact. The aggregate quantity of capital in the economy is denoted by K t , and q t is the price of one unit of capital in the units of output. The total quantity of gold is normalized to one, and the value of all gold in the units of output is denoted by P t .
The aggregate amount of capital K t depends on aggregate investment, the allocation of capital among the different technologies, and technology shocks. The price of capital q t and the value of money P t are determined endogenously from supply and demand.
Net Worths and Balance Sheets. The total net worth of all agents is
The main focus of our model is on the net worth of intermediaries is N t < q t K t + P t . The net worth of the intermediary sector N t relative to the size of the economy K t determines the risk-taking capacity of intermediaries, the amount of financing available to productive technologies and the creation of inside money.
To keep the model tractable, we ignore any effects that arise through changing wealth distribution among households. Specifically, we assume that wealth q t K t + P t − N t is always distributed among households with an exogenous density θ(ω), with
That is, even though shocks and heterogeneous productivity have different effects on the net worth of different households, we assume that household types are completely transient -they switch fast enough to eliminate any temporary wealth accumulation effects. At the beginning of each period, each household gets randomly reassigned to a new type according to the probability distribution θ(ω).
Each household chooses how to allocate wealth between its own productive technology and money. Households may borrow and become levered, allocating a negative portfolio weight to money. Intermediaries invest in technologies of a range of household types ω. We denote the equilibrium allocation of capital across technologies, and between households and intermediaries through functions ξ t (ω) and ζ t (ω) such that
Function ξ t (ω) describes the density of the allocation of capital across households, and ζ t (ω), the technology portfolio of intermediaries. Given the allocation of capital, the aggregate amount of capital in the economy follows
Optimal Investment. Given the current price of capital q t , the optimal investment rate ι t is identical across all agents. It solves
where Φ(ι) is rate at which new capital is created and q t is the price of capital. Since Φ < 0, the solution is uniquely pinned down by the first-order condition Φ (ι)q t = 1. We denote the solution by ι(q t ), and the resulting net output rates and capital growth rates by
Returns on Capital and Money. We denote the law of motion of the price of capital
As a result, household of type ω earns return on capital of
expected capital gains rate
The capital gains rate and risk, which equal d(k t q t )/(k t q t ), and are derived from (3.1) and (3.3) using Ito's lemma. Intermediaries get a return of dr
from investing in technology ω. The return on money is given by the law of motion of P t ,
Preferences and Utility Maximization. All agents have logarithmic utility with a common discount rate of ρ. Logarithmic utility has two convenient properties that significantly simplify the analysis of our model.
1. Any agent with logarithmic utility consumes ρ times his net worth.
2. The solution of the optimal portfolio choice problem of an agent with log utility has a very simple characterization. On the margin, any small change in asset allocation around the optimum has marginal expected return = Cov(marginal risk, net worth risk at optimum). (3.6)
In this equation, net worth risk is measured per dollar of net worth. We demonstrate further the mechanics of applying this condition.
Importantly, the consumption and investment decisions of an agent with logarithmic utility are completely myopic, irrespective of future investment opportunities. The solution procedure for more general preferences specifications is more complicated, and requires the introduction of the agents' value functions and the Bellman equation.
In addition, to control the size of the intermediary sector in our model, we assume that intermediaries may retire. Intermediaries have a difficult job, which requires effort. Upon retirement, they relax and receive an immediate utility boost of x. We denote the retirement rate of experts by N t dΞ t .
The Evolution of N t . Since we know the portfolio of technologies ζ t (ω), in which intermediaries invest, the return of each technology (3.4) and the promised return to depositors (3.5), the law of aggregate intermediary net worth is
(3.7)
In this equation, C t is the aggregate rate of intermediary consumption.
Equilibrium Definition. An equilibrium is characterized by price processes q t and P t , the allocation ξ t (ω) and ζ t (ω) of aggregate capital K t , consumption rates of all agents and the rate of intermediary retirement, which map any history of Brownian shocks {Z s , s ∈ [0, t]} into the state of the economy at time t. The following conditions have to hold (i) All markets, for capital, money and consumption goods, clear
(ii) Intermediaries choose consumption, investment ζ(ω) and retirement to maximize utility and (iii) Households of each type ω choose consumption and the allocation of wealth between money and capital to maximize utility Scale Invariance and Markov Equilibria. Intuitively, because our setting is scaleinvariant, the severity of financial frictions in our economy is quantified by the ratio of expert net worth to the size of the economy,
We expect two economies in which the ratio η t is the same look like scaled versions of one another, and look for a Markov equilibrium with the state variable η t . In a Markov equilibrium, the price of capital q t = q(η t ) and the allocation of capital {ζ t (ω), ξ t (ω)} = {ζ(η t , ω), ξ(η t , ω)} are functions of η t , while the value of money is proportional to K t , i.e.
The laws of motion of P t and p t = p(η t ) are related by
, where dp
Equilibrium Conditions
In this section we derive equilibrium conditions, and develop a method to compute equilibria numerically. We focus on the following conditions from our definition of equilibria:
(i) The market-clearing conditions -two equations guarantee that all three markets clear, by Walras' law (ii) Intermediaries borrow money to gain exposure to each technology ω optimally (iii) Each household type ω chooses the allocation of wealth between money and its own technology optimally
Besides these conditions, we embed the optimal consumption rates into the market-clearing conditions directly, and embed the optimal retirement rate of intermediaries into the law of motion of the state variable η t .
Market-Clearing Conditions. The condition that the market for consumption goods has to clear is
since (q t + p t )K t is aggregate net worth of all agents, and the right hand side of (4.1) is net equilibrium output per unit of capital. The market-clearing condition for capital is just
Intermediaries' Optimal Portfolio Choice. The optimal portfolio choice conditions are based on equation (3.6). The marginal expected return rate from an investment in technology ω, financed by borrowing money, is E[dr
, and, from (3.7), the risk of intermediary net worths is
Therefore, intermediaries choose their portfolios optimally if and only if
with equality if intermediaries invest a nonzero amount in technology ω, i.e. ζ(η t , ω) > 0.
Households' Optimal Portfolio Choice. Household of type ω chooses how to allocate its wealth between its own technology and money. The marginal expected return from an additional allocation to capital is E[dr The optimal portfolio choice condition of household ω is
with equality if the household invests a positive fraction of wealth in its technology, i.e. ξ(η t , ω) > 0.
The Law of Motion of η t . The drift and volatility of q t and p t that enter equilibrium conditions (4.4) and (4.5) depend on the law of motion of the state variable η t . Proposition 1 allows us to reduce the equilibrium conditions to a system of differential equations for q(η) and p(η), together with the portfolio choice processes {ζ(η t , ω), ξ(η t , ω)}.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium η t follows
Proof. From (4.4) and (4.3),
Therefore, from (3.7) and (3.8), the law of motion of N t is given by
Using (3.2) and Ito's lemma,
which simplifies to (4.6).
Because the decision to retire is a real-option problem for experts, they exercise the option when η t reaches a sufficiently high critical level η * , at which competition among experts makes them indifferent between retiring or not. As a result, the state variable η t follows (4.6) with dΞ t = 0 when η t < η * . The process ξ t makes η t reflect at η * .
Differential Equations and Boundary Conditions. Equilibrium conditions (4.1), (4.2), (4.4) and (4.5) can be converted into a system of differential equations for q(η), p(η), as well as {ζ(η t , ω), ξ(η t , ω)}, using Ito's lemma. Terms d 
. The boundary conditions are as follows. The value of η * is uniquely pinned down by the parameter x, the utility boost that intermediaries receive upon retirement. In order to prevent abnormal profits or losses at the reflection point η * , we need that
The level of q(η * ) has to be chosen to match the autarky boundary condition at η = 0, which corresponds to the equilibrium without intermediaries.
An Example
In this version of the paper, we present an example from a simplified version of the model with three types Ω = {ω L , ω M , ω H }. The distribution of wealth among households is given by θ(ω L ) = 65%, θ(ω M ) = 35% and θ(ω H ) = 0. All three production technologies lead the same gross output rate a ω = 1, but different depreciation rates that satisfy δ ω L = ∞, δ ω M = 3% and δ ω H + = 0%. Note that, since the most productive households have zero net worth, we only need to know their productivity net of the monitoring cost. The monitoring cost is large enough so that intermediaries do not want to invest in type ω M technology. The investment function is Φ(i) = √ 0.02i, and shocks to the agent's technologies are given by
where the Brownian motion Z t represents the aggregate shocks, and Z t represent idiosyncratic shocks, which are independent and fully diversifiable across individual agents. The three household types play very specific distinct roles in this example. The low types create a demand for money. The middle types, who do not get financing from the intermediaries, exist to ensure that the average of the shocks that hit the economy is distinct from the average of the shocks that hit intermediary assets. Intermediaries invest in projects with higher and more concentrated risk compared the risk of their liabilities, i.e. money, which in the long run has the same risk as the economy as a whole, that is, d K t .
5
Regarding preferences, we set the discount rate to ρ = 5%, and select the intermediaries' effort cost x to induce them to retire at η * = 2.1.
Figure 1 presents market prices of money and capital, as well as capital allocation, intermediary leverage and the volatility of η t .
As we expected, the price of capital increases with η while the price of money decreases with η. Intermediaries are able to hold more capital for higher η, i.e. ζ(η, ω H ) is increasing in η. At the same time, when η is low, then lower price of capital encourages intermediaries to take on greater leverage. As η → 0, the prices of capital and money converge to q(0) = θ(ω M )a ω M /ρ = 7 and p(0) = θ(ω L )a ω M /ρ = 13, since η t stays at zero if it ever reaches 0.
Both q (η) and p (η) are large near η = 0, which creates significant amplification in the depressed region. A negative macro shock causes the price of capital to fall and the price of money to rise, hitting intermediaries on both asset and liability sides of their balance sheets. As a result, the volatility of η t , which reflects endogenous risk, is high near η = 0. Figure 2 displays the expected rate of economic growth, investment, the volatility of capital and money, and µ q t − µ p t , which enters the expected return of a levered position in capital. As expected, economic growth and investment are higher when η t is larger. The bottom left panel shows the reaction of the values of capital and money to aggregate shocks. Capital becomes cheaper after a negative macro shock as expert demand for capital decreases following a contraction of their balance sheets. On the other hand, a negative macro shock generally increases the value of money, except for η t near η * . As intermediary balance sheets contract, the amount of inside money they create decreases and, to offset this effect, the value of outside money has to rise. Note also that the volatility of a levered position in capital is highest when η is low. This volatility is due to endogenous risk, which is created as the macro shocks get amplified through the intermediaries' balance sheets. High volatility leads to a high required risk premium. Hence, µ q t − µ p t is highest when volatility due to endogenous risk is highest. The impact of µ q t and µ p t on the returns of capital and money can be significant. For η t between 0 and 0.5, these valuation effects easily overwhelm the effects of the changes in fundamentals on the return on money and capital. Recall that the fundamental return on capital stems from output and investment while the fundamental return on money stems from economic growth, i.e. money buys a fixed fraction of the economy in the long run. Figure  3 displays the fundamental components of the return on capital held by intermediaries and type ω M households, as well as money. This component of the return on capital decreases in η as capital becomes more expensive. At the same time, the return on money increases with the expected rate of economic growth.
Importantly, Figure 4 displays various money quantities in our equilibrium. The top panel of Figure 4 exhibits the value of all outside money p(η), as well as the total value of money and the value of inside money. As η increases, intermediaries invest more and create more inside money. As the value of outside money decreases at the same time, the money multiplier expands, as shown on the bottom panel of 
Long-Term Bonds and Monetary Policy
In this section we analyze how a central bank can affect the equilibrium through monetary policy that involves setting short-term interest rates and using open-market operations to change the composition of monetary instruments. As a theoretical exercise, we would like to isolate monetary policies from more general fiscal policies. We do not consider policies that involve government spending, taxation, or explicit redistribution. Rather, we consider a central bank that only has the authority to print money and can issue perpetual longterm bonds, securities that promise a perpetual stream of monetary payments in the future. Interest on long-term bonds can be financed, again, by printing money or selling more longterm bonds.
Unlike in our benchmark model, with active monetary policy the amount of money in the economy is no longer fixed. The quantity of money changes over time, because anybody (households or intermediaries) can deposit money with the central bank to earn a nominal interest rate of r t . In addition, the central bank issues perpetual long-term bonds and sells them in the open market in exchange for money. The central bank can also print money to repurchase some of the bonds. We summarize the policy that affects the composition of outstanding monetary instrument through a process b t , where b t K t is the real market value of all long-term bonds outstanding. Thus, two policy instruments -short-term interest rates and open-market operations -are summarized by a pair of processes {r t , b t }.
For a given policy, we denote the equilibrium nominal price of long-term bonds per unit coupon rate by B t . For example, if r t = r for all t, then the nominal value of a bond that pays 1 in perpetuity is B t = 1/r. If instead in downturns the central bank lowers r t , then we expect B t to increase. We denote the equilibrium law of motion of B t by dB t B t = µ With long-term bonds, the total real wealth in the economy is given by
where p t K t still denotes the real market value of money and b t K t is the real market value of long-term bonds.
The stochastic laws of motion of both p t and b t , r t on borrowed money. The agent is also exposed to the fluctuations of the price of bonds relative to money, µ to the risk of
